Put Your Backs Intuit!

Arguably, philosophers rely heavily on intuition.  In fact, we rely on intuition heavily such that the force of our arguments and the ground of our conclusions are grounded in the strength of intuition.  Some have argued that widespread disagreements of intuition imply a kind of skepticism about philosophy.  Some believe that relying on intuition will resolve these disagreements.  Personally, I think that relying on intuition is rational.  However, I do not think that intuition can solve disagreements.

The argument is really simple. (In this post it is simple.  The long version is here.)  First is the notion that to solve a disagreement, the proponent must explain why the opponent’s view is incorrect.  This would involve some account of a disconnect or interference in the opponent’s evidence, or an account of a mistaken inference on the opponent’s part.  I think it is reasonable to suppose that most philosophers do not make a mistake in inference—at least in terms of putting together a deductively valid argument.  So, in order to explain why the opponent’s view is incorrect, one must provide an account of a disconnect or interference in the opponent’s evidence.

Some philosophers simply claim that their intuitions are the correct ones, i.e., they resort to a sort of name calling—“this intuition is ridiculous”, “that’s crazy”, or “this is obviously false”.  This is mere bluster and not reason.  Some philosophers try to disprove the intuitions.  This is a good step.  However, this will also likely reach a difference in intuition, i.e., this approach merely “backs up” the problem.  Some philosophers try to find the “majority intuition”.  I do not think that this approach will work since the majority intuition changes over time.  Thus, one will have to explain why one time period’s intuition is incorrect—we have another version of just backing up the problem.  Some philosophers try to sort out bias in intuitions.  This is promising in showing a kind of disconnect or interference in intuition.  However, I think the project will ultimately fail since one must explain why a particular belief is bias and not the truth.  You can show that a belief influences another, but you must explain why this does not preserve the truth.  From a certain “distance”, there is no further reason to show that a belief is bias and not simply another intuition.  This just seems like another backing up of the problem.  In the end, an exponent relying on intuition to explain why the opponent’s intuition is wrong fails; for, there is nothing about one person holding an intuition that is contrary to another that shows that the other’s intuition is wrong.

So, relying on one’s intuition as evidence that another’s intuition is false does not work, for it fails to accomplish the task of explaining why there is a disconnect or interference in another’s intuition.  This does not mean that intuition is useless.  We need intuition to form the various philosophical theories to begin with.  This also does not mean that one is irrational in holding one’s in the face of disagreement.  One must work with the evidence that one has.  In fact, to doubt one’s own view in the face of disagreement is to doubt one’s own rational capacity.  However, if one doubts one’s own rational capacity, then one loses reason to do so; for, it is by one’s rational capacity that one reaches that conclusion in the first place!

I believe there is another way of solving disagreements that does not rely on one’s intuition to explain why another’s is incorrect.  I have posted about that here.  Intuition is useful for generating theories, but it cannot solve the disagreement between theories.