The question of why intuitions should be taken as evidentiary is not an easy question to answer. It appears that the best answer for the question is twofold: (1) it is intuitive to think that intuition is evidentiary and (2) the indirect proof. (1) is true and even minimally helpful. (2) is pretty straight forward: any argument concluding that intuition is not evidentiary must itself rely on intuited evidence. Thus, (2) cannot get off the ground. (1) and (2) combined do not provide much of an argument, but it is all that we have; and, it appears that there is little by way of argument to the contrary. So, the intuition advocate claims, it is not much of an argument, but it is all that we have.
Is this really enough? We certainly do not let other sources of evidence get away with this kind of argument. The case against perceptual evidence is astounding in the literature. The same is true for the other sensory sources of evidence. One might ask why intuition gets a free ride. I think either one of two things need to be acknowledged in the philosophical literature. Either philosophers need to acknowledge the epistemic worth of faith (or “trust” or “believing in”) in a source of evidence, or philosophers need to acknowledge that we do not have as much evidence for our philosophical claims as we think do.
Neither approach is desirable. For, if the first is correct, we have found a termination in philosophical discourse that does not answer philosophical disagreements. Worse, if some philosophical view is correct and a philosopher is justified in believing that view on the basis of faith, then the philosopher is unable to demonstrate the truth of the view. If the second option is correct, then we never have philosophical knowledge. For, for some philosopher who happens to believe the correct philosophical view on the basis of intuition (which all philosophers do), that philosopher still does not have evidence; if the philosopher lacks evidence, then the philosopher does not know that the view is correct.
Can some kind of Virtue Epistemology help here? According to such a view, that "faith" gap would be filled by the fact that some ways of forming beliefs _just are_ good ways to form beliefs--the ones that are examples of epistemic virtue. You don't need to value a separate element of trust or faith--simply believing things in this virtuous way is enough.
ReplyDeleteThe question about intuitions, then, would just be the question of whether they are, in fact, good ways to form beliefs. This is, in principle, an empirical matter, though defining a "good way to form beliefs" may not be. But I mean, once you define that, the question is empirical.
Thanks for the reply Kristofer. I am not sure the addition of virtue epistemology is helpful. For, suppose that intuition is a good or virtuous way to form beliefs. Given the wide disagreement between intuitions across culture, history, and individual debates, we have the puzzling conclusion that a good way to form beliefs yields rampant contradictions. I don’t think this conclusion is acceptable.
ReplyDeleteI suppose you could try to say that there are some intuitions that virtuously form beliefs and some that do not. However, the principle that divvies up the intuitions into “virtuous” and “non-virtuous” is doing the real work—not intuition. Also, exactly what this divvying up principle is is something of a mystery. It’s not intuition (for intuition yields rampant contradictions). It’s not perception (for the answers to philosophical questions are not matters of empirical inquiry). What else do we have left?